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1  Introduction 
The recent great recession has sparked the debate of how governments create jobs (Blinder, 2009) and, 
more generally, how they identify and implement effective recovery policies. Caballero (2010, p. 96) 
states that crises appear to be inevitable and unpredictable. As a result, he suggests macroeconomists em-
phasize crafting appropriate recovery policy responses. 
In this paper, we analyze the effects of recovery policies used by governments aiming at fighting un-
employment and/or enhance economic growth. What are the effects of recovery policy instruments on 
involuntary unemployment and endogenous growth? Which policies unequivocally stimulate the rate of 
growth and reduce unemployment? Which policies generate tradeoffs between job-creation and growth, 
highlighting the conundrum of recovery? Are there any policy combinations leading to lower unemploy-
ment and higher growth rates? 
We address these questions by using a dynamic, general-equilibrium model of Schumpeterian growth, 
search unemployment, and financial frictions with the following main features.
1 First, growth is endoge-
nously driven by deliberate innovation efforts of entrepreneurial firms. Innovators discover production 
techniques that lower costs. The arrival of innovations is governed by a stochastic Poisson process. It 
generates fully-endogenous growth of output and total factor productivity (TFP). An innovator enjoys 
temporary monopoly profits that fuel investments in R&D. 
Second, innovators encounter labor market frictions. They must engage in a stochastic search process 
to find, organize, and train workers prior to starting production at full capacity. The matching process re-
quires the creation, maintenance, and management of costly job vacancies. Firms optimize the amount of 
vacancies based on profit-maximization considerations. Matching takes place between blocks of vacant 
positions and workers. As in the case of innovations, the arrival of job-matches is also governed by a sto-
chastic Poisson process. The endogenous arrival of new technologies together with labor market frictions 
gives rise to involuntary, search-based unemployment of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) type. 
Third, firms undertake Rent-Protection Activities (RPAs) to discourage the innovation efforts of po-
tential competitors, with a view to prolonging monopoly tenure and delaying the emergence of a new 
technology leader. We assume that innovation depends directly on R&D investment and inversely on 
RPAs. The latter are financed by retained earnings and include expenditures on patent enforcement, trade 
                                                       
1  The term “Schumpeterian growth” refers to endogenous growth generated through the process of creative de-
struction, as described by Schumpeter (1934).       
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secrets, lobbying, and securing property rights etc.
2 In this model, RPAs have two key features: RPAs 
remove the counterfactual scale-effects property from the model resulting in fully-endogenous growth;
3  
RPAs may dilute, even reverse, the expansionary impact of job-creating policies on growth. In other 
words, policies that reduce unemployment and channel resources into investment activities may hamper 
economic growth by stimulating RPAs more than R&D investment. As a result, RPAs are a driving force 
behind the recovery conundrum: jobless growth or stagnant growth with job-creation. 
The paper does not model the nature and causes of financial frictions, e.g., informational asymmetries 
in financial markets, credit constraints, housing-market bubbles, fiscal and monetary policies, etc. Instead, 
to simplify the analysis and clarify the intuition of results, we assume the existence of an exogenous ag-
gregate systemic risk that raises the probability of default for all firms. Specifically, we identify the im-
pact of the U.S. 2007-2009 financial crisis by substantially increasing the systemic risk. 
The model’s equilibrium is unique, and entails the simultaneous presence of involuntary, search-based 
unemployment as well as Schumpeterian growth. The expected life of a firm is finite, and consists of four 
distinct, consecutive stages. The length of each stage is stochastic and endogenous. In the R&D phase, 
firm size is indeterminate, i.e., each firm is infinitesimally small. Upon discovering a new process innova-
tion, a firm becomes a young technology leader, captures an exogenous and small share of the market, 
and enters the vacancy-creation process. It advertises new positions, interviews prospective workers, de-
velops distribution systems, trains and organizes workers and suppliers. This process is stochastic and 
upon completion, the firm expands production and enters adult stage. The adult firm immediately captures 
the whole market. It is then targeted by potential innovators, and engages in RPAs to delay the emergence 
of a new technology leader. Lastly, the firm enters its old stage, during which it becomes a technology 
follower competing against a young technology leader. As an old firm, it still captures a large part of the 
market. It does not however engage in RPAs and will eventually be replaced by a new technology leader. 
The model generates two types of industries, referred to as A and B industries. Type A industries con-
sist of adult firms that serve the whole market and engage in RPAs. They are targeted by prospective in-
                                                       
2  Costly vacancy creation, stochastic block (as opposed to individual) matching between firms and job-applicants, 
and inclusion of RPAs are three central features that differentiate our work from earlier Schumpeterian models of 
growth and unemployment, such as those of Aghion and Howitt (1994), and Şener (2000, 2001). For detailed em-
pirical evidence on RPAs and theoretical applications, see among others Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007), 
Şener (2008), and Grieben and Şener (2009). 
3  The removal of scale effects further distinguishes our paper from the seminal study by Aghion and Howitt (1994). 
Ha and Howitt (2007), Madsen (2007, 2008), Ang and Madsen (2011), among others, argue that fully-
endogenous growth theory is more empirically relevant than semi-endogenous growth theory. For arguments in 
favor of semi-endogenous growth theory, see Jones (2005).      
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novators. Type B industries consist of young and old firms. In a B industry a young technology leader 
tries to replace an old technology follower by creating more jobs through costly vacancies and stochastic 
matching. In other words, small, young firms create jobs in our model, whereas large, old firms destroy 
jobs.
4 
Albeit there exist frictions in the labor market, the model does not have transitional dynamics.
5 The 
absence of transitional dynamics is driven by two assumptions: perfect foresight in matching; and match-
ing between one firm and many workers (a block) as opposed to matching between one firm and one 
worker (one-to-one matching). The absence of transitional dynamics suggests a short-run interpretation of 
our key results. We highlight this interpretation by assuming a fixed population level. Unless appropriate 
corrective policies are implemented, the absence of transitional dynamics implies that a financial crisis 
may have permanent adverse effects on employment and growth. 
In our model, policies affect employment levels by impacting the rate of job destruction and vacancy 
creation.
6 We analyze the effects of six policies: four job-creation policies consisting of production subsi-
dies targeting either young or adult technology leaders; taxes on old technology followers firing workers 
(employment protection); and subsidies targeting vacancies for young technology leaders; a pro-growth 
investment-related policy subsidizing firms engaged in R&D; and lastly, policies that reduce the systemic 
risk of default such as interest rate subsidies. 
Our model generates intriguing results. A number of policies set up the conundrum of recovery. They 
reveal a positive relationship between growth and unemployment: jobless growth or stagnant growth with 
job creation. We find that production subsidies for adult firms and employment protection legislation im-
ply a trade-off between growth and job-creation. These policies reduce the rates of unemployment and 
growth. Similarly, production subsidies for young firms and R&D subsidies also imply the same trade-off 
between growth and job-creation. They increase growth and unemployment. 
We identify two types of recovery policies that unequivocally stimulate the rate of growth and reduce 
the rate of unemployment: policies that reduce the systemic risk in slow-growth economies; and subsidies 
                                                       
4  This modeling feature is consistent with Haltiwanger et al. (2010). They argue that firm age is more important 
than firm size in the process of job creation and destruction.  
5  The absence of transitional dynamics is a common property of Schumpeterian growth models. See, for example, 
Grossman and Helpman (1991, chapter 4), and Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007). We conjecture that the intro-
duction of one-to-one matching between workers and firms, human and/or physical capital accumulation would 
generate transitional dynamics. 
6  Our model generalizes the related work of Mortensen (2005) who assumes costless vacancy creation. This as-
sumption implies that firms do not choose optimally the number of job vacancies. As a result, Mortensen’s model 
does not allow policies to affect employment through a vacancy-creation process.      
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that reduce the cost of vacancy creation ex-ante (i.e., prior successful matching) rather than ex-post (i.e., 
after successful matching). These policies reveal no trade-offs between growth and employment. 
 Simulation analysis suggests that policy combinations can lead to a higher rate of growth and a lower 
unemployment rate. For example, the appropriate combination of production subsidies targeting adult and 
young firms, or a combination of an R&D subsidy and a production subsidy targeting adult firms can 
stimulate growth and reduce unemployment. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the elements of the model. 
Section 3 derives the equilibrium conditions formally and illustrates the equilibrium graphically. Section 
4 addresses the comparative-static effects of several investment and labor-market policies. Section 5 of-
fers concluding remarks. Algebraic derivations are relegated to various appendices. 
2  The Model 
Our model is a first in adopting a Neo-Schumpeterian approach to macroeconomics in analyzing the ef-
fects of recovery policies. It combines fully-endogenous Schumpeterian growth and Schumpeterian un-
employment. Within the class of endogenous growth models, it is the first to introduce both labor-market 
and financial frictions. 
Our model differs from the real business cycle (RBC) models in two important aspects. First, instead 
of relying on neoclassical growth theory featuring exogenous long-run TFP growth, our model generates 
fully-endogenous growth. Second, instead of generating voluntary unemployment through a leisure-work 
tradeoff as does the RBC approach, our model generates involuntary state-of-the-art equilibrium search 
unemployment of the type advanced by the DMP literature. 
The Neo-Schumpeterian approach to macroeconomics also differs from the so called “periphery” ap-
proaches, using Caballero’s (2010) terminology. In contrast to these approaches that highlight the role of 
informational frictions but rely on a partial-equilibrium framework, we adopt the assumption of rational 
expectations and use a dynamic general-equilibrium framework. 
Our model borrows its elements of growth from Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) which omits un-
employment considerations and financial frictions that constitute the main concerns of our paper. In addi-
tion, there exist three main differences between the approach of the present paper to modeling search un-
employment and the standard DMP literature. First, while the DMP literature relies on the neoclassical 
growth model and exogenous idiosyncratic shocks to generate labor turnover and unemployment, our 
model employs an endogenous job-destruction mechanism linked to endogenous technological change.      
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Second, instead of gradual matches between one worker and one firm, we consider a stepwise matching 
process: an innovator immediately captures a small portion of the market, and then undertakes another 
step that involves block matching to drive out the incumbent firm. Thus, in contrast to the studies of 
Aghion and Howitt (1994) and Mortensen (2005), in our model the matching rate itself contributes to the 
endogenous job-destruction process. Third, unlike Mortensen (2005) or any other macro-labor study we 
are aware of, our paper combines a block-matching feature with costly vacancy creation. This combina-
tion renders unnecessary any bargaining between a worker and a firm. As a result, we are able to maintain 
the assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets, in accordance to endogenous growth theory.
7 
2.1   Consumers 
The economy consists of a continuum of identical and infinitely-lived households whose measure is set 
equal to one. The size of each household is denoted by N and remains constant over time.
 Given the unit 
measure of households, the size of aggregate population also  equals  N.
8  Each household member 
inelastically supplies one unit of labor per period of time. The representative household maximizes the 
infinite horizon utility 
  ( )
 
 0 log
t H e h t dt
ρ ∞ − =∫ ,    (1) 
where ρ > 0 is the subjective discount rate. The subutility function log h(t) is defined as 
  ( )
 1
 0 log log ( , ) ht y td ωω ≡∫ ,    (2) 
where y(ω, t) is the per-capita demand for goods manufactured in industry ω at time t. The economy con-
sists of a continuum of structurally identical industries indexed by ω ∈ [0, 1]. Household optimization can 
be viewed as a two-stage problem. The first stage is a static optimization problem where each household 
allocates consumption expenditure to maximize h(t) for any given product prices. Since goods enter the 
subutility function in a symmetric fashion, each household spreads its per-capita consumption expenditure 
c(t) evenly across all available goods. Thus, demand for each good equals 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ,, Y t ctNP t ωω = ,    (3) 
                                                       
7  In Mortensen (2005), the bargaining solution between each firm and each worker substitutes the firm’s choice of 
profit-maximizing vacancies. With block matching, the individual applicant has no bargaining power. This fea-
ture is realistic because most unemployed workers are not organized in labor unions and coordination among job 
applicants does not occur in practice. 
8  Allowing for positive population growth leaves the key results intact.      
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where Y(ω,t) = y(ω,t)N, and P(ω,t) is the market price of the purchased goods in industry ω at time t. 
From now, for notational simplicity, we drop the time index t where appropriate. 
The second stage involves a dynamic optimization problem in which each household chooses the evo-
lution of c over time. Substituting (2) into (1) and using Y from (3), one can simplify the household’s dy-
namic problem to maximizing 
 
 0 log  
t e c dt
ρ ∞ −
∫  subject to the budget constraint  A   = W + (r − χ)A – cN, 
where A denotes the asset holdings of each household, and W is household expected wage income. Varia-
ble r is the rate of return obtained from a completely diversified asset portfolio. This portfolio allows in-
vestors to avoid idiosyncratic firm-level risk, although they are still subject to systemic aggregate risk. 
This is captured by the risk premium parameter χ ≥ 0 implying a depreciation of household assets by χ 
percent. That is, in normal times we assume that χ = 0. During a financial crisis, households expect a de-
fault on χ percent of all financial investments, without ex-ante being able to identify risky investments.
9 
This implies that the systemic-risk-adjusted rate of return on a fully diversified (idiosyncratic-risk-free) 
portfolio is r − χ. The solution of the dynamic optimization problem provides the Keynes-Ramsey rule, 
amended by the risk premium,
10 
  cc r χρ =−−  .    (4) 
Because the labor supply and the wage rate are constant in the steady state, equation (4) implies a con-
stant per-capita consumption expenditure measured in units of labor
11 and r = ρ + χ in equilibrium. 
Hence, the return to a fully-diversified portfolio r must compensate for the systemic risk. In addition, be-
cause the systemic risk augments the subjective discount rate, an interest rate subsidy has the same eco-
nomic impact as a systemic-risk reduction. 
2.2   Job Creation and Destruction 
Labor is the only factor of production. The labor force consists of low-skilled and high-skilled workers. 
                                                       
9  We include this risk premium as a convenient shortcut to capture the perceived risk of financial intermediaries 
going bankrupt, without explicitly modeling such institutions and money. This modeling approach does not re-
quire that default on investments actually happens – the mere expectation of it suffices to produce a positive risk 
premium, reflecting mistrust that Akerlof and Shiller (2009) have identified as one of the main causes of econom-
ic depressions. 
10  Each household consists of a large number of members who engage in income transfers such that each member 
enjoys the same level of consumption regardless of individual earnings. This implies the absence of effective un-
certainty in individuals’ income and consumption emanating from idiosyncratic firm-level risk. Bayer and Wälde 
(2011) offer a modified version of (4) which takes into account individual income uncertainty. 
11  Nevertheless, the aggregate price index PAGG declines over time whenever innovation takes place as will be 
shown later. As a result, real per-capita consumption measured in units of final output grows over time.      
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The proportion of the former is given as 1 − s and that of the latter is given as s ∈ (0, 1). Low-skilled 
workers can be employed in manufacturing only, whereas high-skilled workers can be employed in either 
R&D or RPAs.
12 We assume that high-skilled workers can find employment instantly without going 
through a job-matching process. Hence only low-skilled workers are subject to turnover and face the pro-
spect of unemployment.
13 
Consider next the hiring process of an innovator. In each industry, production technology improves 
through the stochastic arrival of process innovations. We assume that a young technology leader (an en-
trant) can immediately hire a small number of unskilled workers without engaging in costly search. As a 
result, it captures an exogenous fraction φ ∈ (0, 1) of the market and forces the incumbent to lay off a cor-
responding number of workers.
14 To capture the remaining fraction 1 φ −  of the market, an entrant must 
expand capacity and therefore engage in costly search by posting vacant positions. While the entrant is 
searching, the incumbent continues to supply a fraction 1 φ −  of the market.
15 When the entrant completes 
the hiring process, which occurs with endogenous instantaneous probability q, the incumbent exits the 
market and all of its remaining workers join the unemployment pool. Further innovation in the industry 
triggers again the above job creative-destruction cycle. Hence, at any point in time, young firms create 
and maintain job vacancies and unemployed workers search for and fill the available job vacancies. 
2.3   Industry Structure 
The assumptions that all industries are structurally identical and that only adult firms are targeted by chal-
lengers engaged in R&D imply that, at each point in time, there are two possible industry configurations 
which we refer to as A and B industries. In A industries, there is an adult technology leader serving the 
                                                       
12  By allowing resource mobility between R&D and RPAs, we endogenize the intensity of R&D activity and cap-
ture an  essential feature of endogenous growth theory. This labor assignment is similar to Dinopoulos and 
Syropoulos (2007) and also Grieben and Şener (2009). In these papers labor mobility between R&D and manu-
facturing is assumed, while the portion of labor devoted to RPAs is kept fixed. In contrast, here the portion of la-
bor allocated to manufacturing is fixed but workers face unemployment in this sector. 
13 This is a commonly used assumption in the literature. See, among others, the dynamic growth settings of Şener 
(2001, 2006) and the static model of Davis (1998). This assumption captures in a simple way the well-established 
unemployment differential between high-skilled and low-skilled workers (see e.g. Nickell and Bell, 1995 and 
1996, for descriptive evidence on seven major OECD countries). Moreover, because vacancy creation is costly, 
the assumption of costly high-skilled labor matching would create a conflict with the assumption of free entry in 
R&D activities. 
14  One can view this feature as follows. The technology leader instantaneously employs a share φ of workers em-
ployed by the existing incumbent monopolist. Switching to the technology leader makes sense for these workers 
because they escape the impending unemployment risk. 
15  This step-wise replacement mechanism follows the spirit of Dinopoulos and Waldo (2005, pp. 141-142) where a 
successful product innovator instantaneously captures a small share of the market followed by a gradual switch of 
consumers from the previous-generation product to the state-of-the-art quality product.      
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entire market and entrepreneur firms that invest in R&D to discover the next process innovation. At the 
same time, each adult firm engages in RPAs to protect its monopoly profits by retarding the innovation 
effort of challengers. The reader can think of industries A as “growth-oriented” industries because they 
are targeted by future innovators. In B industries, there is a technology follower in its old phase serving a 
fraction 1 − φ of the market, and a young technology leader with the state-of-the-art production process, 
serving a fraction φ of the market and thereby exerting partial monopoly power. At the same time, the 
new technology leader is searching to hire workers and drive the old technology follower completely out 
of business. One can think of B industries as “employment-oriented” industries: each young firm invests 
in vacancy maintenance and hiring of new workers aiming at expanding capacity and employment. 
Let nA and nB = 1 – nA represent the fraction (measure) of A and B industries, respectively. Let also 
I(ω) = I denote the intensity of the Poisson process that governs the arrival of innovations in each indus-
try. An A industry switches to a B industry with instantaneous probability Idt. Hence, the expected flow 
of industries from A into B is nAIdt. When a young firm successfully completes its hiring process, a B 
industry switches to an A industry. The probability of this event is qdt and hence the expected flow of 
industries from B into A is (1 − nA)qdt. Consequently, the net flow into the A industries is dnA = (1−nA)qdt 
− nAIdt, which implies 
  ( ) 1 A AA n q n In =−−  .    (5) 
2.4   Product Markets 
Manufacturing of final consumer goods uses low-skilled labor only according to a constant returns to 
scale production function 
i m
ii YZ λ = , where Yi is the output of firm i, λ > 1 is a parameter capturing the 
size of each process innovation, integer mi is the number of process innovations which have occurred until 
the time of production, and Zi is the number of low-skilled workers employed. In other words, the term 
i m λ  captures the total factor productivity (TFP) component of production. 
Let λ
m(ω) represent the state-of-the-art productivity level in industry ω. Consider an adult firm in an A 
industry that has access to the state-of-the-art m
th technology and has completed the hiring process. For 
this firm, the marginal (and average) cost of manufacturing one unit of final goods is 
( ) m
L w
ω λ , where wL 
is the wage rate of low-skilled labor. Hence 1/λ
m(ω) measures the amount of low-skilled labor required per 
unit of output in industry ω. 
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The adult firm competes against a follower with access to technology one step down the technology 
ladder, i.e. the [m(ω) – 1]
th technology, and a unit cost of 
( ) 1 m
L w
ω λ
− . These firms compete in a Bertrand 
fashion: the technology leader uses its cost advantage to engage in limit pricing and capture the entire 
market. In equilibrium, the adult firm in an A industry charges a price 




− =  and incurs a 




ω σλ − , where 0 < σa < 1 (σa < 0) is the adult firm’s production subsidy (tax) rate.
16 
The adult firm captures the entire market demand cN/Pa(ω). Thus, in an A industry, an adult firm earns a 
flow of monopoly profits 














− −    = − −=  
.  (6) 







≡ .    (7) 
Hence, the incumbent’s profit flow and labor demand are independent of m, the number of cumulative 
innovations used for production at time t, but depend on λ, the size of process innovations. 
While an adult technology leader earns monopoly profits, it simultaneously invests in RPAs employ-
ing high-skilled labor at a wage rate of wH. The cost of producing X units of RPAs is wHγX, where γ is the 
unit-labor requirement of such activities. Hence, the profit flow net of rent protection costs earned by an 
adult firm is given by 
 
net
a aH wX ππ γ = − .    (8) 
Consider now a typical B industry where there are two producing firms: a low-cost young firm with 
state-of-the-art technology m(ω)
th that serves a portion φ of the market; and a high-cost old firm with 
[m(ω) − 1]
th technology supplying the remaining portion 1 − φ of the market. The profit flow of a young 
firm is equal to φπy. In order to determine πy, note that in B industries, a young firm having access to  
                                                       
16  Specifically, the low-cost adult firm can charge price  ( )
( ) 1 m
aL Pw
ω ωλε
−  =−  , where ε → 0 is infinitesimally 
positive. The high-cost firm can charge a price as low as its marginal cost 
( ) 1 m
L w
ω λ
− ; however, this price does 
not generate positive demand and forces the high-cost firm to exit the market. We assume that followers (previ-
ous technology leaders) retain the capacity to produce using their own technology and rehiring their old workers 
without going through costly worker search again. Thus, they face zero capacity maintenance costs, impose a 
constant threat to enter the market, and force low-cost producers to engage in limit pricing.  
17  Labor demand is given by output produced cN/Pa(ω) times the unit-labor requirement 1/λ
m(ω).




th technology competes in a Bertrand fashion with a follower having access to the [m(ω) − 1]
th tech-
nology. In equilibrium, a  young firm  charges limit  price 




− = ,  faces  market demand 






− , where 0 < σy < 1 (σy < 0) is the young firm’s production 
subsidy (tax) rate. The follower exits the market. The typical young firm does not invest in RPAs since its 
technology is not (yet) targeted by entrepreneurs. Thus, in a B industry, the profit flow earned by a young 













 −−   = − −=  
.  (9) 
Note that πa = πy for σy = σa. 
In B industries, each old firm with the [m(ω) − 1]
th technology can still retain its profit flow in a por-
tion 1 − φ of the market due to labor market frictions. In this segment of the market, an old firm competes 
in a Bertrand fashion against another firm with access to the [m(ω) − 2]
th technology. An old firm in a B 
industry charges a price equal to the marginal cost of the rival firm 




− =  and incurs a unit 
cost 
( ) 1 m
L w
ω λ
− . Thus, an old firm in a B industry earns a profit flow (1 − φ)πa. 
2.5    Job Vacancies and Matching 
In B industries, young technology leaders hold vacancies in order to attract workers. Let VS represent the 
market valuation of a successfully-matched vacancy, i.e., the expected discounted value of profits per 
worker employed. Let Vi denote all vacancies created by a young firm i. Let us also denote with α the 
flow cost of holding a vacancy, which can be interpreted as a fixed recruitment cost that the firm incurs 
regardless of whether a job is filled.
18 Let q denote the probability that all vacant positions of a firm are 
matched. In other words, q is the probability that a young firm in a B industry becomes an adult firm serv-
ing an entire A industry. Young firm i chooses vacancies Vi to maximize qVSVi − αVi. The first term is the 
expected return from posting Vi vacancies and the second term is the cost of holding those vacancies. The 
firm takes the matching rate q and the marginal return from vacancy holding VS as given. Maximizing the 
above expression with respect to Vi yields the first-order condition qVS = α. 
                                                       
18  Pissarides (1985) interprets vacancy costs as (fixed) opportunity costs of machines (capital) required for new job 
openings. We model vacancy maintenance costs as fixed costs following the standard search unemployment liter-
ature.      
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How is VS determined? Successful matching implies a change in the valuation of a young firm that is 
given by Va − Vy > 0, where Va and Vy represent the valuation of an adult firm and a young firm, respec-
tively. Dividing Va − Vy by the amount of jobs held by an adult firm Ja yields VS = (Va − Vy)/Ja. In equilib-
rium, the amount of available jobs (demand for labor) must equal the amount of vacancies held by a 
young firm, that is, Ja = Vi = (1 − φ)Z. All vacancies are subject to the same matching rate (i.e., there is 
block matching). A young firm does not find profitable to maintain more vacancies than the number of 
workers it will employ as an adult firm.
19 Substituting VS and Ja into the first order condition qVS = α 











  VC,  (10) 
where the LHS is the firm-specific expected benefit from holding a vacancy, and the RHS is the cost of 
maintaining a vacancy.
20 
Next, we establish a link between the firm-specific vacancy matching rate q and aggregate labor mar-
ket conditions. Let V ≡ ∑Vi represent the level of economy-wide vacancies and U  the level of economy-
wide unemployment. The arrival of successful job matches is governed by a stochastic process whose 
intensity is given by the matching function M(U, V). We assume that the matching function is concave, 
homogeneous of degree one and increasing in both arguments in accordance to the DMP literature.
21 
Let θ ≡ V/U denote the number of vacancies per unemployed worker capturing labor-market tightness. 
Dividing M(U, V) by V yields the matching (hiring) rate of young firms q(θ) = M(U/V, 1) = M(1/θ, 1). 
Similarly, dividing M(U, V) by U yields the job-finding rate of unemployed workers p(θ) = M(1, V/U) = 
M(1,θ). Note that q(θ) and p(θ) are stochastic Poisson arrival rates, unlike the deterministic rates in 
                                                       
19 If a young firm opens more vacancies than the number of workers employed by an adult firm, then the return to 
holding an extra vacancy drops down to zero. Specifically, VS > 0 for Vi ∈ [0, (1 − φ)Z], whereas VS = 0 for Vi > 
(1 − φ)Z. Note also that although the first-order condition qVS = α leaves firm-level vacancies indeterminate, it 
must hold for a finite level of vacancies. 
20 Equation (10) implies a knife-edge equilibrium condition which can be justified by an adjustment process linked 
to changes in matching rate q. Consider, for example, an increase in the marginal return of vacancy creation  (Va – 
Vy)/[(1 – φ)Z]. This encourages young firms to offer more vacancies. For any aggregate unemployment rate, the 
excess supply of vacancies makes it more difficult for young firms to attract workers. Thus the firm-specific 
matching rate q declines to restore equilibrium. 
21  The matching function has the following additional properties: M(0, V) = M(U, 0) = 0, 
0 lim
x Mx
→ ∂∂  = +∞, and 
lim 0
x Mx
→∞∂ ∂= , x ∈ {U, V}.      
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Aghion and Howitt (1994).
22 Observe that ∂q(θ)/∂θ < 0, that is, as vacancies per unemployed worker in-
crease, it becomes more difficult for firms to fill their vacant positions. Observe also that ∂p(θ)/∂θ > 0, 
that is, as vacancies per unemployed worker increase, unemployed workers can find jobs more easily. The 
transition rates p(θ) and q(θ) satisfy  p(θ)U = q(θ)V = M(U, V). This matching scheme implies that vacant 
positions are matched at the rate of q(θ) because V and U can be interpreted as firm-specific vacancies 
and job-applicants, respectively. 
2.6   Innovation 
Entrepreneurial firms engage in sequential and stochastic R&D races targeting A industries to discover 
next-generation process innovations and replace adult incumbent firms. The latter engage in RPAs in or-
der to retard innovation efforts of challengers. The intensity of the Poisson process that governs the arri-
val of innovations for firm j is given by 
  with jj I RD D X δ == ,    (11) 
where Rj represents R&D services of R&D lab j, and D measures the difficulty of conducting R&D. We 
model R&D difficulty D as a flow variable, where X is the level of RPAs undertaken by an incumbent 
adult firm, and parameter δ is the efficiency of RPAs. 
We assume that Poisson arrival rates are independently distributed across firms, industries, and time. 
Therefore, the industry-wide Poisson arrival rate equals 





= = = ∑∑ .    (12) 
2.7   Financial Market 
There exists a stock market that channels household savings to firms engaged in R&D. Retained earnings 
finance RPAs and vacancy maintenance. During a typical R&D race, a firm issues a flow of shares to pay 
wages of R&D researchers. If a firm wins an R&D race, then it distributes the flow of profits to its stock-
holders as dividends; if the firm does not win an R&D race, its stockholders receive nothing. The exist-
ence of a continuum of industries and the assumption that Poisson arrival rates are independent across 
firms and over time imply that investors can fully diversify firm-specific idiosyncratic risk by holding an 
appropriate portfolio. The return to this stock portfolio is deterministic and equals the market interest rate 
                                                       
22  See Pissarides (2000, chapter 6) and Aghion and Howitt (1998, section 4.5) for alternative stochastic matching 
models, where only a fraction of contacts between workers and open vacancies lead to successful matches.      
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minus the systemic risk of default, r − χ. At each instant in time, there exist distinct stocks issued by 
R&D labs, young, adult, and old firms. These stocks are traded freely among investors. The absence of 
profitable arbitrage in the stock market relates the expected equity returns to the effective interest rate of a 
riskless asset. In what follows we derive the no-arbitrage condition for each of the four stocks. 
Let VR denote the value of a firm engaged in R&D to discover the state-of-the-art process innovation. 
The no-arbitrage condition implies that the expected return to any stock issued by an R&D lab must equal 
the return generated by a fully diversified (idiosyncratic-risk-free) portfolio of equal size. In other words, 
the expected return of investing VR in an R&D lab must equal (r − χ)VR. The expected income from in-
vesting VR in an R&D lab is calculated as follows. Over a time interval dt, an R&D lab innovates with 
probability Ijdt, becomes a young firm, and realizes a valuation gain Vy − VR. This firm incurs R&D costs 
wH(1−σR)βRj, where 0 < σR < 1 (σR < 0) is an R&D subsidy (tax) rate, and β > 0 is the unit-labor require-
ment of R&D. With probability (1 – Ijdt), however, success does not materialize, and stockholders absorb 
capital loss  RR dV V dt =  . The presence of non-diversifiable risk implies that a firm engaged in R&D de-
faults with probability χdt, and its stockholders absorb capital loss VR. Adding these components of equity 
return, we may write the no-arbitrage condition for an R&D lab as 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 (1 ) j yR H R j j R R R I dt V V w R dt I dt V dt V dt r V dt σβ χ χ − − − +− − =−  .  (13) 
It is apparent from (13) that capital loss generated by the systemic risk cancels out and does not affect the 
valuation of R&D firms. Free-entry in R&D activities drives firm value to zero, i.e.,  0 RR VV = =  . Taking 
limits as dt → 0 and using (11) yields the following R&D free-entry condition
23 
  ( ) 1 H y R wX V βδ σ = − .    (14) 
Consider now the stock market valuation of a young firm in a B industry. This firm serves a fraction φ 
of the market by employing φZ units of labor and realizes profit flow φπy. At the same time it maintains Vi 
= (1−φ)Z vacant positions aiming at expanding its capacity and capturing the entire market. As mentioned 
earlier, each vacancy costs α > 0 to maintain per unit of time. Thus, over time interval dt total costs of 
holding vacancies are α(1−φ)Zdt. By incurring these costs, a young firm succeeds to complete the hiring 
process with instantaneous probability q(θ)dt. This firm becomes an adult firm serving the entire market, 
                                                       
23  An alternative derivation of R&D free-entry condition is as follows. Consider firm j that is engaged in R&D. Dur-
ing the time interval dt, this firm incurs with certainty a cost of wH(1 − σR)βRjdt which corresponds to the subsi-
dized wage bill of employing βRj researchers. The expected benefit of R&D investment is VyIjdt. Setting the ex-
pected benefit equal to the cost of R&D, and using (11), yields (14).      
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and moves from industry B to A. Its stockholders realize a capital gain Va − Vy > 0. With probability 1 – 
q(θ)dt, no matching occurs. In this case stockholders realize a change in valuation  yy dV V dt =  . Finally, 
the firm defaults with instantaneous probability χdt, and its stockholders absorb capital loss Vy. In the ab-
sence of stock-market arbitrage opportunities, the expected return generated by investing an amount Vy in 
stocks issued by a young firm must equal the return of a fully diversified portfolio of equal size (r − χ)Vy. 
Collecting terms, we may write the no-arbitrage condition for a young firm as 
  ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 y ay y y y dt q V V dt Zdt q dt V dt V dt r V dt φπ θ α φ θ χ χ + − − − + −  − = − 
 .  (15) 
Taking limits as dt → 0 yields the following expression for the stock market value of a young firm 












+−  .    (16) 
Next, consider the stock-market valuation of an adult firm. Over a small time interval dt, its stockhold-
ers receive dividends equal to the net profit flow 
net
a dt π = (πa − wHγX)dt. With instantaneous probability 
Idt, further process innovation occurs, and the adult monopolist becomes an old firm in a B industry with 
valuation Vo. In this case, stockholders of an adult firm absorb capital loss Va − Vo > 0. In addition, the 
firm must lay off φZ manufacturing workers incurring a firing cost f > 0 per worker.
24 With probability (1 
–  Idt), no further  innovation occurs in the industry. In this case  stockholders realize a capital gain 
aa dV V dt =  . Finally, with instantaneous probability χdt, the firm defaults and its stockholders absorb capi-
tal loss Va. Collecting terms, we may write the no-arbitrage condition of an adult firm as 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 a H ao a a a w X dt I V V f Z dt Idt V dt V dt r V dt πγ φ χ χ − − −+ +− − =−  .  (17) 
Taking limits as dt → 0 yields the following expression for the stock market value of an adult firm 
  ( ) o aH
a
aa
IV f Z w X
V
I rVV
φπ γ − +−
=
+−  .    (18) 
Finally, consider the stock market valuation of an old firm. This firm is a technology follower and 
serves 1 − φ fraction of a B-industry market. In a time interval dt, stockholders of an old firm receive (1 − 
φ)πadt as dividend payments. With probability q(θ)dt, a young technology leader drives an old firm out of 
                                                       
24 Parameter f can be interpreted as an employment termination or layoff tax imposed by the government on firms 
that lay off workers. This parameter captures the effects of employment protection legislation.       
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the market. In this event, the stockholders of an old firm absorb capital loss Vo. In addition, the old firm 
must lay off the remaining (1 − φ)Z workers and must incur firing cost f > 0 per worker. With probability 
1 – q(θ)dt, no matching occurs in the industry. In this event, stockholders realize capital gain  oo dV V dt =  . 
Finally, with probability χdt, the old firm defaults and the stockholders absorb capital loss Vo. Collecting 
terms, we may write the no-arbitrage condition of an old firm as 
  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) 1 () 1 1 () a o oo o dt q V f Z dt q dt V dt V dt r V dt φπ θ φ θ χ χ − − + − +− − = − 
 .  (19) 
Taking limits as dt → 0 yields the following expression for the stock market value of an old firm 










−−   =
+−  .    (20) 
2.8   Rent Protection Activities 
Adult firms serving A industries, face the threat of innovation and undertake rent protection activities 
(RPAs), denoted by X, aiming to prolong the expected duration of temporary monopoly profits by delay-
ing the success of challengers. Adult firms optimally choose X at each point in time to maximize expected 
discounted profits, as stated in LHS of (17). This maximization yields the following RPA condition:
25 
  ( ) H ao w X IV V f Z γφ = −+   RPA.  (21) 
The LHS of (21) equals RPAs expenditure and increases with the threat of innovation I and the capital 
loss associated with successful innovation Va – Vo + fφZ. 
2.9   Labor Markets 
At each instant in time, each low-skilled worker can either be employed or unemployed. In B industries, 
when a young firm expands capacity, an old firm exits the market and fires its low-skilled workers. The 
fraction of industries that experience this type of labor turnover is q(θ)(1 – nA). In each B industry the 
number of workers employed by an old firm is (1 − φ)Z. As a result, the flow of workers into the unem-
ployment pool during time period dt equals q(θ)(1 – nA)(1 − φ)Zdt.
26 The flow of workers out of unem-
                                                       
25  The RPA condition is derived as follows. Use (12) and (11), note that I(X) = R/(δX), and set the derivative of the 
LHS of (17) with respect to X to zero. Using dI(X )/dX = −I/X < 0 and taking limits as dt → 0 yields (21). 
26  There are additional flows into and out of unemployment that cancel out each other. In A industries, with instan-
taneous probability I, an entrepreneur successfully innovates, the incumbent monopolist loses a fraction φ of the 
market, and lays off φZ workers. This event creates an inflow InAφZ into the unemployment pool. However, this 
is matched by instantaneous hiring of the same number of workers by successful entrepreneurs in all A industries.      
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ployment during time period dt is driven by successful job finding of unemployed workers, which is giv-
en by p(θ)Udt. As a result, the equation of motion for the level of unemployment U is given by 
  ( )( )( ) ( ) 11 A Uq n Zp U θ φθ = − −−  .
27    (22) 
At each point in time, young technology leaders in B industries maintain vacant positions to hire 
workers. The fraction of B industries is equal to 1 − nA. The number of vacant positions in each industry is 
equal to labor demand Vi = (1 – φ)Z. Thus, the economy-wide vacancy rate, defined as vacancies per low-
skilled worker v ≡ ∑Vi/(1 − s)N = V/[(1 – s)N], equals 










.    (23) 
There is a labor market for low-skilled workers and a separate one for high-skilled workers. In each 
market, the supply of employed workers must equal the demand for labor. As a result, the labor market 
clearing conditions for low-skilled and high-skilled workers may be written as 
  ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 11 1 1 1 AA A u sN Zn n n Z φφ − − =+− +− − =  ,  (24) 
  ( ) A sN n X R γβ = + ,    (25) 
where u ≡ U/[(1 – s)N] is the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers. 
Substituting Z from (24) into (22), and using the definitions of u and v, provides the following equa-
tion of motion for the rate of unemployment u 
  ( )( )( )( ) ( ) 1 11 0 A uq n u p u θφθ = − − −− =  ,    (26) 
where q(θ)(1 – nA)(1 – φ) is the economy-wide job-destruction rate, and p(θ)u is the economy-wide job-
finding rate. Equation (26) states that  0 u =  . This result is obtained by using (23) to substitute V/Z for (1 
− nA)(1 − φ), V = v(1 − s)N, (24) to substitute for Z, and identity p(θ)u ≡ q(θ)v from the matching function. 
Equation (26) holds both in and out of steady-state equilibrium and implies that unemployment does not 
exhibit transitional dynamics. The absence of transitional dynamics is driven by two assumptions: perfect 
                                                       
27  Note that the equation of motion for vacancies V is the same as (22). In a fraction nA of industries, with probabil-
ity I young firms create Vi vacancies. The total matching at each point in time is given by pU = qV. It follows that 
V  = InAVi − qV. In the steady-state equilibrium, V  = 0 and therefore Vi = qV/(InA). Substituting into this expres-
sion the stock of vacancies V from equation (23) and taking into account (1 − nA)/nA = I/q from in (5) with  A n  = 0, 
provides Vi = (1−φ)Z, and thus V  = InA(1−φ)Z − pU. Using InA = (1 − nA)q yields the RHS of (22).      
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foresight in matching; and matching between one firm and many workers (a block) as opposed to match-
ing between one firm and one worker (one-to-one matching). 
3  Steady-State Equilibrium 
We establish that the equilibrium is unique and does not exhibit transitional dynamics as in Dinopoulos 
and Syropoulos (2007). Appendices A, B and D provide algebraic details. We choose low-skilled labor as 
the numéraire by setting wL ≡ 1.
28 At the steady-state equilibrium per-capita consumption expenditure c is 
constant over time. It then follows from equation (4) that the market interest rate is r = ρ + χ.
29 In con-
trast, the arrival of process innovations generates positive endogenous growth of TFP, output, per-capita 
consumption expenditure measured in units of output, and consumer utility. The arrival of innovations 
generates deflation as the aggregate price level of final goods falls at constant rate  AGG AGG PP  = −nAIlogλ 
(please see Appendix C for details). 
The equilibrium is characterized by the following system of three equations in three unknowns:  the 
matching rate () q θ ; the rate of innovation I and the rate of unemployment u (please see Appendix A for 
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  CD.  (29) 
                                                       
28  Alternatively, one could normalize per capita consumption expenditure by setting c ≡ 1. This normalization pro-
vides explicit determination of low-skilled wage rate wL. Equation (7) implies Z ≡ cN/(λwL) = N/(λwL). Combin-
ing this result and (24) generates wL = 1/[λ(1−u)(1−s)]. This approach, however, complicates the presentation of 
steady-state equilibrium without providing additional insights. 
29  In addition, the absence of population growth implies that the following endogenous variables remain constant 
over time: rate of vacancies v, R&D investment R, level of rent protection activities X, profit flows, stock market 
values of firms, allocation of labor across activities, and the wage of high-skilled labor wH.      
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The vacancy-creation (VC) condition (27) is the reduced form of (10) and expresses the equilibrium 
matching rate q(θ) as a function of  parameters. The matching rate is a monotonically decreasing function 
of labor-market tightness, that is ∂q(θ)/∂θ < 0. Let us denote with  () q θµ ≡  the inverse function that de-
termines the market tightness measure θ as a declining function of the matching rate q. Therefore (27) 
pins down q and (unique) θ = v/u, from which the job-finding rate of workers p(θ) is determined. 
The relative-profitability (RP) condition (28) expresses the rate of innovation I as a function of 
matching rate q(θ) and parameters. Let us first consider the RHS. Term 1/[B(1 − σR)] is the cost of R&D 
relative to RPAs. The numerator is the market value of a young firm per unit of output  Vy/Z 
1 ( 1 )( ) y φλ σ ρ χ
− = −+ +. The term in square brackets captures the expected return to RPAs, measured by 
the difference in per-output market value between an adult firm and an old firm (Va − Vo − fφ)/Z. As a re-
sult, the RHS of the RP condition is proportional to Vy/(Va − Vo + fφZ) which is the expected return of 
R&D relative to RPAs, i.e., the relative profitability of R&D. Observe that the RHS of (28) is monoton-
ically decreasing in q. As a result, once the matching rate q is determined, equation (28) pins down the 
equilibrium innovation rate I. 
The creative destruction (CD) condition (29) combines (26) with equation (5) with  0 A n =   imposed. 
The LHS of (29) corresponds to the rate of labor flow into unemployment, and the RHS represents the 
rate of labor flow out of unemployment. With q, p and I determined, CD condition (29) and the expres-
sion of θ
  = v/u from the VC equation (27) determine simultaneously the equilibrium levels of u and v.
30 
The creative destruction condition corresponds to  a  general-equilibrium  version of the Beveridge 
curve, which plays a prominent role in DMP models of search unemployment.
31 Specifically, one version 
of the Beveridge curve is obtained by assuming that the job-separation function Ψ (I,θ) ≡ (1 − φ)q(θ)I/[I + 
q(θ)] =ψ  is an exogenous parameter. One can then express equation (29) as  ( ) u pvu ψψ = +    which 
                                                       
30  With I, q, θ, and u determined, the remaining endogenous variables can be obtained in a standard recursive fash-
ion. The level of nA follows from imposing  A n  = 0 in (5). Substituting R = IδX, from (11) and (12), into (25) yields 
X. Substituting u into (24) gives Z and thereby c, πa and πy can be recovered from (6) and (9). With πy and X de-
termined, wH is derived from (A.2). 
31  In line with empirical evidence, the present model generates a Beveridge curve which is unambiguously down-
ward sloping in (u, v) space. Consider an increase in v, holding u constant. Restoring the CD condition requires a 
lower u because of two reasons. First, a higher v/u ratio raises the job-finding rate p(θ) and reduces u. Second, a 
higher v/u ratio decreases the matching rate of young firms q(θ) and hence the replacement rate of old firms, 
again reducing u. The unambiguously downward sloping Beveridge curve is an improvement over the DMP liter-
ature according to which the slope of this curve is ambiguous (see e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides 1994, p. 403, 
Pissarides 2000, p. 47, or Caballero 2007, pp. 127-128).      
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is the standard representation of the Beveridge curve. The present model complements and generalizes the 
DMP theory of unemployment by recognizing explicitly and taking into account the dependence of the 
job-separation rate on labor market tightness, and on virtually all general-equilibrium parameters – in-
cluding the systemic risk – that affect the rates of innovation and growth. Changes in these parameters 
shift the standard representation of the Beveridge curve.
32 
We next derive an expression for the rate of growth. The endogenous arrival of process innovations 
generates growth in instantaneous consumer utility. The latter captures the appropriately weighted con-
sumption index and corresponds to real per-capita income. It is possible to obtain the following expres-
sion for instantaneous utility
33 
  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) log log 1 1 log log AA h t c n n It λ φλ λ = −− − + .  (30) 
The first term captures the effect of per capita output expressed in units of low-skilled labor c/λ under the 
assumption that all firms charge the same price as young firms. The second term reflects a price adjust-
ment based on the fact that old firms charge a higher price than young firms, Po > Py. This price prevails 
in a share 1 − φ of each B industry. These industries account for fraction 1 − nA of all industries. If there 
are no B industries, i.e., 10 A n −= , or no old firms, i.e., 10 φ −= , the second term is zero. The third term 
captures the standard dynamic effect caused by the arrival of process innovations: every time an innova-
tion occurs in an industry, the instantaneous utility jumps up by logλ; and during the period from time 
zero to t the expected number of innovations occurring in each of nA growth-oriented industries is It. Dif-










.   GR  (31) 
The growth rate is proportional to the rate of innovation I, the measure of growth-oriented industries nA, 
and parameter log(λ) capturing the impact of innovation size. 
We now illustrate the equilibrium graphically in (q, I) space. We assume a Cobb-Douglas matching 
function: 
1 (,) MUV VU
ηη − = , which implies 
(1 ) q
η θ





− = = , and an elasticity of market tight-
ness θ with respect to the matching rate q denoted by ε = −(∂µ/∂q)q/µ = 1/(1 − η) > 1. The VC condition 
                                                       
32  Recent shifts in the Beveridge curve have been identified and discussed by prominent economists, e.g., Diamond 
(2011), Mortensen (2011), and Pissarides (2011). Our model offers a Neo-Schumpeterian perspective capturing 
general equilibrium shifts in the Beveridge curve. 
33  Appendix C provides detailed calculations yielding (30).      
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(27), which determines the equilibrium value of q as a function of the model’s parameters, is shown in 
Figure 1 by vertical line VC. The RP condition (28), which establishes an inverse relationship between I 
and q is shown by the downward sloping curve RP. The intuition behind the shape of curve RP is as fol-
lows. A higher matching rate q reduces the valuation of old firms Vo/Z by increasing their replacement 
rate and expected firing costs. Thus, for an adult firm the incentives to avoid replacement and engage in 
RPAs become stronger. The profitability of RPAs relative to R&D increases, and this leads to a lower 
innovation rate I. 
To show the unemployment and growth rates in (q, I) space, we utilize the CD condition (29) and GR 
equation (31). The corresponding graphs are illustrated with the iso-unemployment (UU) and iso-growth 
(GG) curves. Consider first the UU curve. Totally differentiating (29) for a given u using q(θ)θ = p(θ) and 








= − −+ < 

,    (32) 
where  1 ε >  under a Cobb-Douglas matching function. In this case, the typical UU curve in (q, I) space is 
downward sloping and convex to the origin. Moving away from the origin in (q, I) space implies higher 
unemployment rates. The intuition behind the negative slope of a UU curve is as follows. A higher match-
ing rate q  increases aggregate job destruction rate qI/(I+q). Higher  q  also implies a lower vacancy-
unemployment ratio θ and hence a lower job-finding rate p. Both effects raise the unemployment rate u. 
Along a UU curve the unemployment rate must remain constant. This requires a reduction in the innova-
tion rate I reducing the labor flow into unemployment by lowering the mass of industries subject to re-
placement 1 − nA = I/(I+q). 
Consider next the iso-growth GG curve. Totally differentiating equation (31) for a given g yields 
  ( )
2
gg dI dq I q
= = − .    (33) 
A typical GG curve is convex to the origin and downward sloping. The intuition behind the negative 
slope is as follows. A higher q increases growth by raising the fraction of growth-oriented industries nA.  
Along a GG curve the rate of growth must be constant. This property requires a reduction in the innova-
tion rate I. Moving away from the origin in (q, I) space implies higher growth rates. Direct comparison 
between (32) and (33) establishes the following property. If ε > 1, a condition which holds under a Cobb-
Douglas matching function, then the UU curve is steeper than the GG curve for any pair of (q, I). 
Insert Figure 1 (Steady-state equilibrium) here      
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Figure 1 illustrates the iso-unemployment UU and iso-growth GG curves passing through the initial 
equilibrium levels of u and g. These curves divide the (q, I) space into four quadrants. It follows from (29) 
and (31) that the GG curve depends only on λ, and that the UU curve depends only on technological and 
policy-invariant parameters φ and ε. The rest of parameters, including policy-related ones that change the 
initial equilibrium by shifting the RP and the VC curves, neither affect the position nor the shape of iso-
unemployment and iso-growth contours. This leads to the following result. 
Proposition 1: An economic policy that shifts the initial equilibrium point E in Figure 1 to a 
new equilibrium point located in:  
•  quadrant I generates higher growth g and lower unemployment rate u; 
•  quadrant II generates higher growth g and higher unemployment u; 
•  quadrant III generates lower growth g and higher unemployment rate u; 
•  quadrant IV generates lower growth g and lower unemployment u. 
The four quadrants in Figure 1 illustrate clearly the conundrum associated with recovery policies or 
economic shocks. Quadrants II and IV show the area where growth and unemployment are positively cor-
related. A move from the initial equilibrium to any point in quadrant II generates jobless growth; whereas 
a move to any point in quadrant IV results in stagnant growth with job creation. One of the main insights 
of the neo-Schumpeterian approach to macroeconomics is that higher growth may not necessarily come 
with lower unemployment and vice versa. Quadrants I and III establish a negative relationship between 
unemployment and growth as one would find in a conventional textbook model of macroeconomics. A 
move to a final equilibrium point located in quadrant I generates an economic recovery with higher output 
growth and lower unemployment; whereas a move to quadrant III generates a recession with lower 
growth and higher unemployment. 
The model also captures the possibility of a recession followed by a jobless recovery. For example, 
consider a shock (e.g., captured by an increase in systemic risk) which moves the initial equilibrium to 
quadrant III. The absence of transitional dynamics implies that the economy jumps instantaneously to a 
lower rate of output growth and a higher rate of unemployment. The instantaneous drop in employment 
implies a downward jump of output which will show up as negative GDP growth when measured in dis-
crete time intervals. After the initial jump, the level of output increases gradually at the rate of lower but 
still positive TFP growth, while the rate of unemployment remains unchanged. Eventually, the level of 
output reaches and surpasses its initial level without any change in the rate of unemployment generating a 
jobless recovery.      
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4  Economic Policies 
We begin our analysis by considering policies shifting only the RP curve or only the VC curve. Then we 
analyze other policies shifting both curves. To resolve ambiguities, we assume a Cobb Douglas matching 
function and perform numerical simulations using benchmark parameters from the U.S..
34 Table 1 shows 
the numerical implementation of our model for the benchmark case, as well as numerical results that cor-
respond to the policy analysis in subsections 4.1 – 4.4. We use Figure 1 to illustrate the “conundrum of 
recovery policies” and the growth and unemployment effects of various policies. In Figure 1, we draw the 
RP curve such that it lies between the UU and GG curves. This turns out to be the empirically relevant 
case which is consistent with numerical simulations. 
Insert Table 1 (Numerical analysis) here. 
4.1   Employment Protection 
Most advanced countries implement some form of employment protection legislation, which imposes re-
strictions on worker dismissals that may take the form of cumbersome administrative procedures increas-
ing firings costs.
35 An increase in employment-separation (firing) costs f > 0 shifts the RP curve down in 
Figure 1 without affecting the VC curve. As a result, the rate of innovation I declines but the matching 
rate q and v/u ratio remain the same as before the policy change. The equilibrium point moves to quadrant 
IV generating lower unemployment and lower growth rates. 
What is the intuition behind this result? Higher firing costs f exert no influence on the vacancy creation 
incentives as captured by (27). This leaves q and v/u unaffected. An increase in f, however, leads to a fall 
in the relative R&D-RPA profitability as captured by the RHS of (28) and thus reduces I. The mechanism 
works primarily through RPA incentives. First, there is a direct effect of higher f on RPA incentives as 
captured by the last term in (21). With the increase in f, the firing costs that adult firms incur rise. Thus, 
adult firms have more to lose if further innovation occurs. This strengthens their incentives to invest in 
RPAs. Second, a higher f reduces the value of old firms Vo by increasing their expected firing costs. This 
implies that adult firms have even more at stake to lose if further innovation occurs. This strengthens their 
incentives to engage in RPAs. Both effects clearly imply a fall in the relative R&D-RPA profitability and 
a lower rate of innovation I. 
                                                       
34  In general, the benchmark parameters are in line with recent growth literature employing numerical simulations. 
Notes under Table 1 provide details on the choice of benchmark parameters. 
35 Skedinger (2010) offers a comprehensive study of this legislation and its effects.      
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The intuition behind the effect on unemployment is straightforward. A lower innovation rate I, caused 
by higher firing costs, decreases the fraction of B industries 1 – nA = I/(I + q) that are subject to replace-
ment. The reduction in the fraction of B industries lowers the aggregate job-destruction rate (1 − φ)qI/(I + 
q) and the unemployment rate u. The growth effect is also clear. With q unchanged, the lower rate of in-
novation I unambiguously reduces g. 
In short, changes in employment protection policies, captured by f, imply a tradeoff between growth 
and job creation illustrating the conundrum of recovery. 
Proposition 2: A higher employment-termination cost f > 0 has no effect on matching rate q but 
reduces the rates of unemployment u, innovation I, and growth g. 
4.2   Vacancy Costs 
Such costs may consist of advertising vacant positions, maintaining a human resources department, reim-
bursing outlays of applicants (e.g. travel and lodging costs), etc.
36 Please consider Figure 1. A decrease in 
vacancy cost parameter α shifts the VC curve left without affecting the RP curve. The innovation rate I 
increases, the matching rate q and the v/u ratio decline. Under the empirically relevant case, where the RP 
curve lies between the UU and GG curves, the economy moves to quadrant I increasing growth and re-
ducing unemployment. 
What is the intuition behind these beneficial effects? A lower vacancy cost α strengthens the vacancy 
creation incentives and leads to more vacancies per unemployed worker θ ≡ v/u. The higher θ makes it 
more difficult for young firms to match their positions, thus the matching rate q decreases. Formally, the 
fall in q and the rise in θ follow from (27) and θ ≡ µ(q), respectively. A lower matching rate q increases 
the valuation of old firms Vo because their likelihood to be replaced and expected firing costs decline. As 
a result, adult firms face weaker incentives to defend their positions through RPAs and reduce their level 
X. Lower R&D difficulty implies a higher innovation rate I. 
Unemployment is affected through several channels. First, when young firms face a lower matching 
rate q, the rate at which old firms are replaced decreases and the fraction of industries subject to replace-
ment (1 – nA) increases. The net effect points to a fall in the aggregate job-destruction rate (1 − φ)qI/(I + 
q), and thus the unemployment rate u declines. Second, when the incentives to create vacancies and hence 
                                                       
36  A decrease in α may become operational by defining marginal vacancy creation costs α ≡  ( ) ˆ 1 V ασ − , and con-
sidering an increase in the vacancy creation and maintenance subsidy rate σV. See Hagedorn and Manovskii 
(2008, pp. 1698-99) and the references therein for empirical evidence on search costs associated with vacancies.      
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the θ ≡ v/u ratio increases, the job finding rate of unemployed workers p increases and thus u declines. 
Third, with faster innovation I, the fraction of B industries 1 – nA increases and therefore u increases. In 
the empirically relevant case where the RP curve is between the UU and GG curves, the first two effects 
dominate the third one, causing a decline in the unemployment rate u. 
Growth is affected through two channels: higher innovation rate I promotes growth, whereas the re-
duction in the fraction of growth-oriented industries nA (driven by lower q and higher I) reduces the rate 
of growth. The former effect dominates increasing the equilibrium rate of growth g. 
The aforementioned analysis leads to 
Proposition 3: Policies that reduce the costs of vacancies α reduce the matching rate q. For the 
empirically relevant case where the RP curve is between the UU and GG curves, the economy 
moves to quadrant I, attaining a higher rate of growth g, a higher rate of innovation I, and a 
lower rate of unemployment u. 
4.3   Production and R&D Subsidies 
a. Production Subsidies Targeting Small Young Firms 
An increase in production subsidy for young, small and scalable (job-creating) firms σy reduces the mar-
ginal profitability of vacancy creation by increasing the market valuation of young firms Vy and reducing 
the market value of adult firms Va, as indicated by the LHS of (27). The VC curve shifts to the right, lead-
ing to a higher matching rate q and lower θ ≡ v/u ratio.
37 An increase in σy raises also the returns to R&D 
relative to RPAs, captured by the RHS of (28). For a given matching rate q, higher R&D profitability 
stimulates innovative activity I and hence the RP curve also shifts to the right. In Figure 1, with both RP 
and VC curves shifting to the right, the economy can potentially move to quadrant II or III. Clearly, q in-
creases but the change in I is indeterminate. Numerical simulations show that the rate of innovation I in-
creases. 
                                                       
37  The mechanism behind this result is as follows. An increase in σy raises the profit flows of young firms πy in (9), 
and thus their valuation Vy in (16). This also implies higher rewards from innovation as captured by the Vy term in 
(14). Maintaining the R&D free-entry condition (14) requires an increase in R&D costs, which are proportional to 
wHγX. This, in turn, translates into higher RPA expenditure for adult monopolists in A industries and thus their 
valuation Va as captured in (18) decreases. With the marginal gains from vacancy creation Va – Vy decreasing, 
each young firm in B industries creates fewer vacancies. In other words, the market tightness θ ≡ v/u decreases 
and q(θ) rises, an adjustment which restores the zero-profit condition in vacancy creation (10).      
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In regards to economic intuition, note that several competing forces affect the rate of innovation. A 
larger σy directly increases the valuation of young firms Vy, strengthening the entrepreneurs’ incentives to 
engage in R&D. However, there exist indirect effects that work through a higher q and a lower Va. A 
higher matching rate q reduces the valuation of old firms Vo and encourages adult firms to increase RPAs. 
This indirect effect reduces the relative R&D-RPA profitability and exerts downward pressure on I. A 
lower valuation of adult firms Va works in the opposite direction by reducing their RPA incentives. Nu-
merical simulations show that the direct effect dominates increasing the equilibrium rate of innovation I. 
A higher subsidy to young firms raises the rate of unemployment through three complementary chan-
nels. First, a higher matching rate q implies that old firms get replaced at a faster rate and the fraction of 
employment-oriented industries 1 – nA decreases. The net effect of these changes is a higher aggregate 
job-destruction rate (1 − φ)qI/(I + q). Second, when vacancy-creation incentives decline and young firms 
create fewer openings, the job finding rate of workers p decreases. Third, when the rate of innovation I 
increases, the mass of industries subject to turnover 1 – nA also increases. All three effects raise the unem-
ployment rate u. With regards to growth, we observe two effects working in the same direction. The faster 
innovation rate I and the increase in the fraction of growth-oriented industries nA driven by higher q (de-
spite the mitigating effect of higher I) both work to accelerate the growth rate g. 
In short, a subsidy to small young firms creates a tradeoff between jobs and growth and hence a recov-
ery-policy conundrum. It accelerates the rates of innovation and growth by increasing the relative profita-
bility of R&D. It also reduces profitability from vacancy creation by encouraging firms to remain small 
and young. Thus a subsidy to young firms decreases the job-finding rate of workers and increases the re-
placement rate of old firms as more firms prefer to stay young and small. These two effects along with the 
rise in the mass of industries subject to turnover lead to more unemployment. 
b. Production Subsidies Targeting Large Adult Firms 
An increase in σa raises the profitability of vacancy creation by raising the valuation of adult firms Va, as 
captured by the LHS of (27). The VC curve shifts left leading to a lower matching rate q and higher θ ≡ 
v/u ratio. An increase in σa also reduces the relative profitability of R&D as indicated by the RHS of (28). 
For a given q, this hinders innovative activity I and hence the RP curve also shifts left. In Figure 1, with 
both RP and VC curves shifting left, the economy can potentially move to quadrant I or IV. Clearly, q 
decreases but the change in I is indeterminate. Numerical simulations show that the equilibrium rate of 
innovation I decreases.      
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What is the intuition? A higher subsidy to adult firms σa directly increases their valuation Va by in-
creasing their profit flows. Why should this encourage the matching effort of young firms? The reason is 
that young firms make their vacancy-creation decisions by taking into account the increase in market val-
ue upon successful matching. Subsidies to adult firms raise their market value and strengthen the incen-
tives of young firms to engage in vacancy creation in order to become adult firms. Young firms open up 
more vacancies generating a higher v/u ratio, and a lower matching rate q. 
What changes the innovation rate despite the fact that there is no direct or indirect effect of this subsi-
dy on the valuation of young firms Vy? The mechanism again works through RPA incentives and relative 
R&D profitability. Specifically, when adult firms are subsidized and attain higher valuations, they now 
have higher incentives to defend their position through RPAs. We should note that there is a mitigating 
factor due the lower matching rate q, which increases the valuation of old firms Vo and reduces the RPA 
incentives of adult firms. The net effect is a reduction in the relative profitability of R&D and a decline in 
the equilibrium rate of innovation I. 
We briefly summarize three distinct effects of a higher σa on the rate of unemployment. First, a lower 
matching rate q generates a lower aggregate job destruction rate (1 − φ)qI/(I + q). Second, when young 
firms create relatively more openings they increase the job-finding rate of workers p. Third, a lower rate 
of innovation leads to a lower fraction of industries subject to turnover 1 − nA. All three effects reduce 
unemployment. With regards to growth, we may identify two effects working in the same direction. A 
lower rate of innovation I and a smaller fraction of growth-oriented industries nA driven by lower q (de-
spite the mitigating effect of lower I) both work to reduce the growth rate g. 
In short, a policy of subsidizing large adult firms implies a tradeoff between growth and jobs. It be-
longs to the conundrum of recovery policies. It raises the returns from vacancy creation by rewarding 
successful job-matching more generously. This helps with fighting unemployment. It has no direct effect 
on R&D incentives (as measured by the direct rewards from successful R&D Vy) but it motivates adult 
firms to defend their positions more rigorously. This reduces relative profitability of R&D and retards 
innovation. The lower innovation rate also helps to reduce unemployment by slowing the rate of industry 
turnover. 
c. R&D Subsidies 
An increase in R&D subsidy rate σR > 0 reduces the market valuation of adult firms Va in (27) and (28).
38 
                                                       
38  An increase in the tax rate on RPAs could be incorporated by replacing B in (28) with  ˆ B ≡ B/(1 + σX) and consid-     
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As a result, this growth-oriented investment policy generates the same qualitative effects as those trig-
gered by an increase in production subsidy targeting young firms σy. It increases the rates of growth and 
innovation by reducing the costs of the latter, and raises the rate of unemployment by leading to a higher 
labor turnover. It thus creates a recovery-policy conundrum as well. The analysis of production and R&D 
subsidies leads to 
Proposition 4: The following policies raise the matching rate q, and (based on numerical simu-
lations) increase the rates of unemployment u, growth g and innovation I: 
i)  an increase in young firms’ production subsidy rate σy > 0; 
ii)  a decrease in adult firms’ production subsidy rate σa > 0; 
iii)  an increase in R&D subsidy rate σR > 0. 
Even though single subsidy policies belong to the conundrum of recovery, numerical simulations show 
that combinations of such policies can lead to a recovery with higher growth and lower unemployment. 
For example increasing σa from zero to 0.1 and σy from zero to 0.2 reduces the rate of unemployment 
from 8.15% to 6.75% and increases the rate of growth from 0.62% to 0.66%. In general, we find that set-
ting σy higher than σa can lead to lower unemployment and higher growth. Alternatively, a combination 
of an R&D subsidy σR and a subsidy to adult firms σa can generate lower unemployment and higher 
growth. 
4.4   Financial Frictions 
Hall (2010, pp. 12-13) points out that a key element of the U.S. 2007-2009 financial crisis was the dra-
matic increase in credit spreads (difference between private borrowing rates and long-term treasury bond 
rates), reflecting inter alia the expected default of many financial assets. Hall (2010, Figure 4) reports that 
the spread between the Baa corporate bond rate and the 20-year treasury bond rate, which is a reasonable 
measure of the systemic risk χ in our model, increased gradually from about 1.5 percentage points in Jan-
uary, 2007, to about 5 percentage points in January, 2009. Since February 2009, the credit spread showed 
a gradual decline reflecting among other factors the impact of expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. 
As a result, the evidence from the initial period 2007-2008 of the great recession is more appropriate to 
study the effects of financial frictions. In this paper, we do not seek the reasons behind these events, but 
                                                                                                                                                                           
ering an increase in σX > 0. This policy is isomorphic to an increase in an R&D subsidy σR because it reduces the 
relative profitability of RPAs.      
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rather analyze the effects of an upward once-and-for-all jump in the risk premium χ on employment, va-
cancy creation, and growth. 
Turning to the model, we start our analysis with the following observations. The VC condition (27) de-
livers a dynamic general-equilibrium channel that relates the systemic risk parameter χ to labor-market 
frictions. It fills a gap in the DMP model which is based on the assumption of perfect financial markets.
39 
Changes in the systemic risk parameter work through changes in the effective discount rate which equals 
the market interest rate r = ρ + χ. For example, in the model a two percent increase in the systemic risk 
can be fully neutralized by a two percent subsidy in the market interest rate.  Motivated by the U.S. 2007-
2009 financial crisis, we focus on the effects of a higher systemic risk. The analysis is readily applicable 
to monetary policies that reduce the effective discount rate such as interest rate and credit subsidies. The-
se policies deliver opposite general equilibrium effects compared to the effects generated by an increase 
in systemic risk. 
As said, the direct effect of a higher systemic risk χ is to raise the effective discount rate for both 
young and adult firms and reduce their valuations Vy and Va. For adult firms, there is also an additional 
effect associated with RPAs. A larger χ reduces what is at stake for the adult firms and thereby lowers 
their RPA expenditure. The fall in Va turns out to be larger than the fall in Vy if and only if φ < φ
C ≡ B(χ + 
ρ)/4, a condition which is satisfied for a wide range of parameters consistent with an interior equilibri-
um.
40 Thus we conclude that a higher χ reduces Va – Vy  and hence decreases the incentives to engage in 
vacancy creation. This shifts the VC curve to the right, resulting in a lower labor-market tightness θ = v/u 
and a higher matching rate q.
41 
Turning to the RP condition, we note that what matters is the change in the R&D incentives relative to 
RPA incentives, i.e., the Vy/(Va – Vo + fφZ) ratio, which corresponds to the RHS of (28). All stock market 
valuations decline as a result of an increase in the risk premium. A higher χ reduces Vy and Vo by increas-
ing their effective discount factor, ρ + χ and ρ + χ + q, respectively, as shown in (27) and (28). A higher 
                                                       
39 Concluding his Nobel Prize lecture, Pissarides (2011, pp. 1103-04) identifies this research gap by stating that 
“The financial crisis of 2008 has thrown open the question of the interaction between capital and labor markets. 
Equilibrium matching models are built on the assumption of perfect capital markets. The implied arbitrage equa-
tions under perfect foresight and unlimited borrowing and lending are used to calculate a value for jobs and 
workers. These are good starting assumptions, and they have yielded important results. But future work needs to 
explore other assumptions about capital markets and integrate the financial sector with the labor market”. 
40  This condition follows from imposing ∂(Va – Vy)/∂χ < 0 using (27) and setting subsidy rates to zero to simplify. 
41  These effects are consistent with labor-market evidence witnessed during the U.S. 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
Pissarides (2011, Figure 7, p.1101) illustrates that, during the period of January 2008 and April 2009, the US un-
employment rate increased and the vacancy rate declined as the US moved along its Beveridge curve.      
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χ reduces the valuation of adult firms Va if and only if φ < φ
CC ≡ 1/[(4/B(χ + ρ)) + 1], a condition which 
also holds for a wide range of parameters consistent with an interior equilibrium.
42 Numerical simulations 
show that R&D incentives Vy fall by more than RPA incentives Va – Vo + fφZ. For a given q this leads to a 
decline in the equilibrium innovation rate I, and a leftward shift of the RP curve. 
The intuition behind these changes is as follows. An increase in risk premium χ exerts a proportionally 
larger impact on the effective discount rate of the young successful innovators ρ + χ. This is because the 
effective discount rates applying to adult firms and old firms depend on additional factors which dilute the 
impact of χ. For adult firms, these factors are the partial replacement threat due to innovation and the 
RPA costs [please see second component of term Va/Z in (27)]. For old firms, these factors are the full 
replacement threat due to matching by young firms q and expected firing costs incurred by old firms fq 
[please see term Vo/Z in (28)]. In summary, with VC shifting to the right and RP shifting to the left due to 
a higher systemic risk, the innovation rate I declines. In Figure 1, the economy can potentially move to 
quadrant III or IV. The growth rate g is subject to two forces. The lower I decreases g and the higher q 
increases it. Numerical simulations show that the change in innovation rate I dominates the change in 
matching rate q decreasing the equilibrium growth rate g.
43 
Next, we consider the effects of a higher systemic risk on the rate of unemployment. A higher q in-
creases the aggregate job-destruction rate (1 − φ)qI/(I + q), raising unemployment. A lower tightness θ = 
v/u decreases the job-finding rate of workers p, also raising unemployment. The only effect that reduces 
unemployment is related to the decline in innovation rate I. The latter effect reduces the fraction of B in-
dustries subject to labor turnover 1 − nA and thus decreases unemployment. 
Numerical simulations show that the impact of the risk premium χ on the unemployment rate u is 
complex and depends on the level of growth. Specifically,  at sufficiently low  initial  innovation  and 
growth rates, an increase in χ raises the unemployment rate. In other words, when growth is low, the re-
duction in vacancy creation incentives is larger relative to the reduction in relative R&D profitability. The 
effects of higher q and lower p dominate over the effect of the lower I leading to a net increase in unem-
ployment. Whereas at sufficiently high innovation and growth rates, an increase in χ reduces the unem-
ployment rate. This is because when growth is high, the reduction in vacancy creation incentives is now 
smaller compared to the fall in relative R&D profitability. 
                                                       
42  This condition follows from imposing ∂Va/∂χ < 0 from (27) and setting subsidy rates to zero to simplify. 
43  Our finding that an increase in systemic risk reduces economic growth is empirically supported by Adrian et al. 
(2010).      
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We thus conclude that a financial crisis generated by a once-and-for-all increase in the systemic risk is 
more detrimental to low-growth economies by reducing growth and increasing the rate of unemployment. 
Figure 2 illustrates the growth and unemployment effects of continuously rising values of ρ + χ for alter-
native values of the innovation-size parameter λ, which is related positively to the rate of growth: as the 
systemic risk rises, the rate of growth declines monotonically but the rate of unemployment first declines 
(for high growth rates) and then rises (for low growth rates).
44 
Insert: Figure 2 (Growth and unemployment effects of rising ρ + χ ∈ [0.035, 0.095]) here. 
The following proposition summarizes the main aforementioned results. 
Proposition 5: Numerical simulations show that an increase in the systemic risk of default χ 
i)  raises the matching rate q, and reduces the rates of innovation I and growth g; 
ii)  increases (reduces) the unemployment rate u at low (high) initial growth rates. 
5  Concluding Remarks 
This paper is a first to adopt a neo-Schumpeterian macroeconomic approach to financial frictions, growth 
and jobs. It develops a model that highlights the general-equilibrium nexus among financial frictions, un-
employment and fully-endogenous Schumpeterian growth. Financial frictions are modeled as an exoge-
nous systemic risk that augments the market rate of interest faced by consumers and firms. Unemploy-
ment is modeled according to the DMP theory. Fully-endogenous growth stems from the market interac-
tion between profit-maximizing R&D efforts of entrepreneurs and rent protection activities (RPAs) of 
adult firms that wish to protect the flow of temporary profits. RPAs deliver a scale-free growth environ-
ment, but they set up the conundrum of recovery: policies that reduce the rate of unemployment may re-
duce the rate of growth by increasing the profitability of RPAs relative to R&D investment, and by shift-
ing resources away from firms engaged in R&D. 
The model delivers a steady-state equilibrium which is unique and does not exhibit transitional dynam-
ics. It also generates a version of the Beveridge curve that allows us to trace the general-equilibrium ef-
                                                       
44  Based on Figure 2, our model implies that shocks to λ generate a negative correlation between TFP growth g and 
unemployment rate u. This is consistent with the empirical evidence as shown by Postel-Vinay (2002, Figure 1 on 
p. 740). Our result contrasts with Aghion and Howitt (1994, p. 488) who find a positive relationship between g 
and u in their endogenous growth setting. We think that there is a good case for considering shocks to λ as the 
source of TFP growth shocks since other policy/technology parameters (affecting g through the innovation rate I) 
seem more stable over time. Moreover, shocks to λ can capture not only technology shocks common across coun-
tries but also input price shocks that affect profit margins.      
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fects of financial frictions and recovery policies on unemployment and vacancies. We use the model to 
analyze the effects of five recovery policies aiming at reducing unemployment or/and accelerating eco-
nomic growth. Table 2 provides a summary of analytical and numerical results. 
Insert: Table 2 (Summary of results) 
Growth-stimulating policies, such as R&D subsidies or production subsidies targeting young firms 
searching for workers, have trade-offs. They indeed boost growth but also raise unemployment. In con-
trast, trade-offs between growth and employment disappear with certain policies. For example, subsidiz-
ing the costs of vacancy creation directly (i.e., by reducing vacancy creation costs during the search pro-
cess) results in higher growth and higher employment. In addition, simulation analysis suggests that the 
policy maker can find combinations of policies to reduce unemployment and increase growth. These poli-
cies include subsidizing young and adult firms at different rates, or combining an R&D subsidy with a 
production subsidy targeting adult firms. 
We also investigate the impact of financial frictions by analyzing an increase in the systemic risk of 
default. We find that an increase in the risk premium decreases the rates of innovation and growth, while 
the unemployment effect is ambiguous. According to numerical analysis, at sufficiently low growth rates 
an increase in the risk premium raises the rate of unemployment; whereas it reduces the rate of unem-
ployment at sufficiently high growth rates. As a result, in slowly growing economies, a rise in financial 
frictions measured by a higher systemic risk may have particularly severe economic adverse effects. In-
terest rate policies that reduce the effective discount rate reverse the effects of a higher systemic risk. 
We are the first to admit that these novel results are suggestive rather than conclusive, because they 
depend on reasonable but undoubtedly somewhat restrictive assumptions and in some cases on numerical 
simulations. For instance, financial frictions are modeled as an exogenous systemic risk of default; the 
model omits human and physical capital accumulation; the scale effect property is removed in a particular 
way. The model assumes that subsidies are financed by lump sum taxes and abstracts from public finance 
issues stemming from government budget deficits. Relaxing these assumptions leads to feasible and wel-
come generalizations and extensions of our model. 
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Figure 1: Steady-State Equilibrium 
Figure 2: Growth and unemployment effects of rising ρ + χ ∈ [0.035, 0.095] 
Notes:  In this graph, each line is drawn for a given λ and identifies the equilibrium combinations (u, g) that result 
when ρ + χ changes, while all other parameters take their benchmark values from Table 1. Moving down on 
each line corresponds to higher levels of ρ + χ. At points A, B, C and D, respectively, ρ + χ takes its lowest 
value 0.035. At points E, F, G and H, respectively, ρ + χ takes its highest value 0.095. For all cases of λ 
considered here, the critical ρ + χ that makes the impact on unemployment switch is in the 0.05-0.06 range. 
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Table 1: Numerical analysis 
Benchmark parameters: σy = 0, σa = 0, f = 0, λ = 1.25, ρ + χ = 0.06, α = 0.2, φ = 0.01, N = 1, s = 0.01, A 
= 0.13, η = 0.6, σR = 0, B ≡ βδ γ  = 1, γ = 1, wL = 1 
Endogenous variables  Benchmark 
solution 
  σy = 0.05    σa = 0.05  f = 0.05     ρ + χ 
   = 0.07 
   α = 0.18 
Innovation rate I  0.04589    0.06735    0.02838    0.04454    0.04027     0.05210 
A industry share nA  0.61194    0.54544    0.66147    0.61902    0.66154     0.55559 
Matching rate q  0.07237    0.08082    0.05547    0.07237    0.07872     0.06513 
Job finding rate p  0.31301    0.26522    0.46640    0.31301    0.27590     0.36660 
Vacancy rate v  0.35284    0.39575    0.32229    0.34692    0.30583     0.40807 
Unemployment rate u  0.08157    0.12059    0.03833    0.08021    0.08726     0.07250 
High-skilled wage rate wH  2.42472    2.53428    2.69847    2.45325    2.22091     2.23641 
Consumption expenditure c
  1.13655    1.08827    1.19006    1.13825    1.12952     1.14779 
RPA level X  0.01562    0.01718    0.01470    0.01546    0.01453     0.01711 
Firm value Va  2.52567    2.17654    3.43796    2.52944    2.30514     2.55064 
Firm value Vy  0.03789    0.04353    0.03966    0.03794    0.03227     0.03826 
Firm value Vo  1.70012    1.53021    2.44875    1.67801    1.50381     1.81622 
 Stock market value V
TOT  2.19886    1.87599    3.09493    2.19881    2.02894     2.21636 
Utility growth rate g = nAIlogλ  0.00627    0.00820    0.00419    0.00615    0.00594     0.00646 
Notes:  Here we provide the main results of a Mathematica
© Appendix, which is available upon request and also on 
the authors’ websites. The stock market value V
TOT is defined as V
TOT ≡ nAVa + (1 − nA)[φVy + (1 − φ)Vo]. We 
chose the size of innovations, λ = 1.25, so as to be consistent with the gross markup (the ratio of the price to 
the marginal cost) enjoyed by innovators. According to the literature, the value of the markup is between 
1.05 and 1.4 (see Basu 1996 and Norrbin 1993). The subjective discount rate ρ is set at 0.06 to capture a real 
interest rate of 6 percent. This value is in the range suggested by Mehra and Prescott (1985) as the average 
real return on the U.S. stock market during the past century (7 percent) and the value of 3 percent used by 
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999). Jones and Williams (2000, p. 73) argue in favor of using such relatively 
high real interest rates rather than risk-free rates on treasury bills of around 1%. The matching function takes 
the Cobb Douglas form as in Blanchard and Diamond (1989) with M(U, V) ≡ AV
ηU
1 − η where η = 0.6, such 
that q = A(1/θ)
0.4 and p = Aθ
 0.6. The benchmark value for the vacancy-creation costs α = 0.2 is very close to 
the value 0.213 used by Shimer (2005). We chose other benchmark parameters φ = 0.01, A = 0.13, B ≡ βδ/γ 
= 1 and γ = 1 with the objective to generate reasonable values for various endogenous variables. Specifical-
ly, these parameters generate a growth rate close to g = 0.5% as suggested by Denison (1985), and an unem-
ployment rate around 8 percent. We note that a low φ corresponds to a high degree of labor market frictions 
faced by successful innovators. It also implies ceteris-paribus a low R&D reward. Initial low profits earned 
by young successful firms are consistent with the notion of “crossing the chasm” in studies of how high-tech 
markets evolve over time, e.g., see Moore (2002). The proportion of high-skilled workers s is set at 0.01 to 
generate a wage differential wH/wL ≡ wH that is significantly greater than 1. Our definition of “high-skilled” 
workers is very narrow, because it comprises only those working in R&D and RPAs. N = 1 and wL = 1 are 
convenient normalizations. Finally, setting σa = σy = σR = f = χ = 0 serves as a useful, distortion-free refer-
ence case.      
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Table 2: Summary of results 
Policy 
change 
Effects in Figure 1  Analytical results  Simulation results 
VC  RP  Quadrant 
move 
q  I  g  u  nA  q  I  g  u  nA 
σa ↑  left  left  I, IV  ↓  ↑↓  ↑↓  ↑↓  ↑↓  ↓  ↓  ↓  ↓  ↑ 
σy ↑  right  right  II, III  ↑  ↑↓  ↑↓  ↑↓  ↑↓  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↓ 
f ↑  none  left  IV  −  ↓  ↓  ↓  ↑  −  ↓  ↓  ↓  ↑ 
α ↓  left  none  I  ↓  ↑  ↑↓  ↑↓  ↓  ↓  ↑  ↑  ↓  ↓ 





III, IV  ↑ iff 
φ < φ
 C 
↑↓  ↑↓  ↑↓  ↑↓  ↑  ↓  ↓  ↑↓  ↑ 
Notes:  An increase in R&D subsidy rate σR > 0 or RPA tax rate σX > 0 yields the same qualitative effects as an in-
crease in σy. Interest rate policies reducing the effective discount rate correspond to a decline in χ.      
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Appendix A: Derivation of Equilibrium Equations 
The VC condition (27) is derived as follows. Start with substituting r = ρ + χ and  yy VV  = 0 in (16). Next, 
substituting α(1 − φ)Z = q(θ)(Va − Vy) from (10) and πy from (9) into the resulting expression provides the 
following equation for Vy 







.    (A.1) 
Combining (A.1) with (14) yields the following free-entry in R&D condition 
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.    (A.3) 
Solve (A.2) for wHX and substitute the resulting expression and πa from (6) into (A.3) to obtain 














+ −+  
,    (A.4) 
where Z = cN/λ from (7) and choice of numéraire, i.e. wL ≡ 1; and B ≡ βδ/γ  is the resource requirement of 
R&D relative to RPAs. Substitute Vy from (A.1) and Va from (A.4) into the vacancy-creation condition 
(10), and observe that Z cancels out. This yields the VC condition (27) in the main text. 
The RP condition (28) is derived as follows. Substituting r = ρ + χ,  oo VV  = 0, πa from (6) into (20), 
and noting Z = cN/λ yields 








=  ++ 
.    (A.5) 
                                                       
45  Equations (A.1) and (A.2) illustrate the necessity of the assumption that an innovator captures a small fraction of 
the market immediately (i.e., φ > 0). Where φ = 0, the reward to R&D vanishes, i.e., Vy = 0 and there is no 
Schumpeterian growth and labor turnover.      
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Dividing (A.2) by (21) using Vy from (A.1), Va from (A.4), and Vo from (A.5), yields the RP condition 
(28) in the main text. 
Finally, the creative-destruction (CD) condition (29) is derived as follows. Setting  A n  = 0 in (5) 
yields nA = q(θ)/[I + q(θ)]. Next, substitute this expression into (26) to obtain equation (29) in the main 
text. 
Appendix B: Existence and Uniqueness of the Equilibrium 
Solving (27) for q and simplifying implies that for q > 0, the following parametric restriction must hold 
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.  (B.1) 
Because q is strictly declining in θ ≡ v/u, condition (B.1) guarantees the existence and uniqueness of θ, 
and hence of q(θ) and p(θ). As a result to have unique I > 0, the denominator of (28) must be positive, 
which gives us our second parametric restriction 
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,  (B.2) 
where q is given by (B.1). Conditions (B.1) and (B.2) must jointly hold for a unique interior equilibrium. 
Our numerical simulations show that these restrictions indeed hold for a wide range of empirically rele-










= +  − 
. 
Appendix C: Growth Rates  
a. Growth Rate of Instantaneous Utility 
We obtain the growth rate of instantaneous utility h(t) as follows. Substituting y(ω,t) = c(t)/P(ω,t) from 
(3) into (2);  using Pa(ω,t) = Py(ω,t) = wL/(λ
m(ω) − 1) for a fraction nA + (1 − nA)(1 − φ) of industries; Po(ω,t) 
= wL/λ
m(ω) − 2 for a fraction (1 − nA)φ of industries, wL ≡ 1; and taking into account that only a fraction nA of 
                                                       
46  The simulations use Mathematica version 8. The source programs are available upon request and also on the au-
thors’ websites.      
 
A3 
industries are targeted for innovation at each point in time, provides 
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The last line, which is equation (30) in the main text, uses the property 
( )  1 ,
 0log
mt d
ω λω ∫  = (logλ)IAGGt of 
stochastic Poisson processes (see Grossman and Helpman 1991, p. 97). We note that IAGG = InA captures 
the expected aggregate innovation rate. Every time a labor saving innovation takes place in a fraction nA 
of the industries, a potential for a price decline by λ materializes and the value of the integral term 
( ) , log
mt d
ω λω ∫  increases by logλ. This is the dynamic component of welfare due to technological pro-
gress. In Appendix E, we provide a formal welfare analysis. 
The static component is the logarithm of the quantities consumed of goods summed over all industries, 
and it is given by log(c/λ) − (1 − nA)(1 − φ)logλ. The first term is standard, whereas the second term ac-
counts for different prices charged by old and young firms: old firms charge a price 1/λ
m(ω) − 2 in a share 1 
− φ of B industries, whose fraction is 1 − nA. This exceeds the price charged by young firms, 1/λ
m(ω) − 1. 
Differentiating expression log h(t) derived above with respect to time and taking into account  A nc =  = 
0, which hold in the steady-state equilibrium, yields the growth rate of instantaneous utility 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) log log A h h g In Iq I q λλ ≡= = +  . 
b. Growth Rate of Aggregate Output 
The economy-wide output level at time t is calculated as follows. In each of the nA growth-oriented indus-
tries, an adult firm produces λ
m−1Z units of output.  In the remaining 1 − nA employment-oriented indus-     
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tries, a young firm produces φλ
m−1Z units of output and an old firm produces (1 − φ)λ
m−2Z units of output. 
Hence aggregate output is given by 
 
















= ++ ∫∫ ∫ . 
The Poisson process governing the arrival of innovations implies that the expected number of innova-
tions E[m(ω)] in industry ω at time t equals I(ω)nAt. At each point in time only a fraction nA of all indus-
tries are targeted for innovation; thus, I(ω)nA is the expected innovation success rate in industry ω. The 
assumption of structurally identical industries implies that in  the steady-state equilibrium we have 
E[m(ω)] = m and thus: 
  ( )
1 1 11 ( ) 1 (1 )
mm m
AA Yt n Z n Z Z λ λ φ φλ λ
−−− −  = +− +− = Ψ  , 
where Ψ ≡ nA + (1 − nA)[φ + (1 − φ)λ
−1] is constant over time at the steady-state equilibrium. Taking logs 
and differentiating with respect to time, and using E[m] = nAIt, gives the following output growth rate: 
  ( ) ( ) log ( ) log 1 log log log 1 log log log AA Yt m Z nI t Z YY nI λ λλ = Ψ+ − + = Ψ+ − + ⇒ =  . 
c. Growth Rate of Prices 
The growth rate of prices is derived as follows. We start with the price growth rate of a typical industry. 
In the present model, firm level prices remain the same during each phase and follow a stepwise process 
with each jump caused by a switch to firm status. At the industry level, however, process innovations 
generate downward price adjustments. Consider first an industry ω that is currently registered as an A 
industry, where P
A = wL/λ
m(ω) − 1. Using E[m(ω)] = I(ω)nAt and wL ≡ 1, one can calculate the growth rate of 
expected prices in this industry as 
 
( ) [ ]
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  
To determine the growth rate in expected goods prices in the φ and 1 − φ segments of any industry cur-
rently registered as B industry, first note that P
B,φ = wL/λ
m(ω) − 1 and P
B,1−φ = wL/λ
m(ω) − 2, and then use deri-
vations analogous to the case of an A industry analyzed above to obtain 
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− = = −

. 
Thus, we conclude that in any industry ω, regardless of which type of industry it is currently registered as,      
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the rate of decline in expected price level is I(ω)nAlogλ. With structural symmetry across a continuum of 
industries, the growth rate  in  the  aggregate price level  is deterministic and given by  AGG AGG PP  = 
−nAIlogλ. It follows that per-capita consumption measured in units of output (i.e., c/PAGG) grows at the 
rate nAIlogλ. 
Appendix D: Absence of Transitional Dynamics  
The discussion following equation (26) establishes that the rate of unemployment u does not exhibit tran-
sitional dynamics. It then follows from (24) that there cannot be transitional dynamics for Z either. Since 
we normalized wL ≡ 1, (7) implies that there are no transitional dynamics for c as well. Hence equation (4) 
implies that r is always equal to ρ + χ in and out of steady-state equilibrium. Equations (6) and (9) then 
imply that there are no transitional dynamics for πa and πy, respectively. Furthermore, since there are no 
transitional dynamics for u, and given ∂q(θ)/∂θ  < 0 from the matching function which pins down a 
unique θ = (v/u), there cannot be transitional dynamics for v either. Since there are no transitional dynam-
ics for Z, it then follows from (23) that nA does also not display transitional dynamics. Next, since there 
are no transitional dynamics for u and v, the same applies to q(θ) and p(θ). Using the results obtained so 
far, it follows from (20) that there are no transitional dynamics for Vo. 
Since nA = q(θ)/[I + q(θ)], absence of transitional dynamics for nA and q(θ) implies absence of transi-
tional dynamics for I. Given no transitional dynamics for q(θ) and Z, it follows from (10) that there are no 
transitional dynamics for Va − Vy. Using this fact in (16) together with the results obtained so far, it fol-
lows that there are no transitional dynamics for Vy, and hence for Va as well. According to (14) or (21), it 
follows that there are no transitional dynamics for wHX. Using this as well as the absence of transitional 
dynamics for nA and I, it follows from (25) that there are no transitional dynamics for X, given R = ID = 
IδX. Finally, this result together with the previous argument implies that there cannot be transitional dy-
namics for wH as well. 
Appendix E: Welfare Analysis  
Substituting expression (30) into the intertemporal utility function (1), taking into account the absence of 
transitional dynamics, and evaluating the resulting integral yields the following expression for the house-
hold discounted utility: 
  ( ) ( )( ) ( )
log 1








  =+ −− −  
 
.        
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Note that g = nAIlog(λ) and c/λ = (1 – u)(1 – s), which follows from (24) and (7). Thus, policies that in-
crease g (dynamic effect) and reduce unemployment u (a static effect) are good candidates to raise wel-
fare. Nevertheless, we also need to consider the change in 1 – nA, which captures the presence of old firms 
in B industries charging higher prices (a static effect). 
The welfare effects of recovery policies are ambiguous and depend on parameter values. It is apparent 
from the welfare expression that policies generating a recovery conundrum yield ambiguous welfare ef-
fects. However, even policies that increase growth and reduced unemployment may generate ambiguous 
welfare effects. For example, consider first a reduction in vacancy costs α that increases g and reduces u. 
Both effects increase welfare. However, a lower α reduces q and increases I leading to an increase in 1 – 
nA = I/(I + q) and a decrease in welfare. As a result, the overall welfare effect of lower vacancy costs is 
ambiguous. Another recovery policy to consider is a reduction in risk premium χ in a low-growth econo-
my. A lower χ raises welfare by increasing g and reducing u. But again a lower χ increases 1 – nA by re-
ducing q and increasing I. This effect reduces welfare. Extensive numerical simulations show that policy 
welfare effects depend on the parameters of the model. 